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Introduction 
 
The Rule of Law in Contemporary Ukraine 
Widespread Elite Failure Puts Reforms at Risk 
Susan Stewart 
Ukraine’s Euromaidan protest movement, which brought about the fall of President 
Yanukovych in 2014, has led to a comprehensive process of reforms. However, this pro-
cess is being hampered and delayed by a large number of internal and external hurdles. 
There are particularly significant obstacles to establishing a state governed by the rule 
of law. Preserving areas in which a legal vacuum exists is in the interests of influential 
political and economic actors because such areas contribute to their personal enrich-
ment and help maintain their power. It is therefore important to examine the progress 
that has been made and the hurdles that have been encountered in establishing the rule 
of law. Such an analysis can help German and European actors to take well-founded 
decisions on how to support Ukraine’s moves towards rule-of-law structures more effec-
tively than they have in the past. 
 
When Ukraine finds itself the focus of 
western attention, this tends to be mainly 
because of the ongoing fighting in the east 
of the country, or the efforts to end that 
violence on the basis of the Minsk accords 
and stabilise the situation in the Donbas. 
Less notice is taken of the fact that Ukraine 
has initiated an ambitious process of re-
forms, the results of which are likely to 
have an even more decisive impact on the 
country’s future than developments in its 
eastern regions. 
On the one hand, Ukraine has gone 
further down the path of reforms than 
at any other point in its history since the 
collapse of the USSR. This is due to the 
strong pressure exerted on the political 
elite by Ukrainian (civil) society, and to 
the support given the reforms by external 
actors such as the EU and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Reform-oriented mem-
bers of the Ukrainian elite – those for whom 
the top priority is the common good – also 
play a significant role in this process. On 
the other hand, there are substantial hurdles 
involved in passing and implementing the 
reforms. To date, genuine systemic change 
towards a law-governed state has not been 
achieved. First, because the war in the Don-
bas with all its consequences – especially 
the large numbers of internally displaced 
persons – monopolises many financial and 
political resources that could otherwise 
benefit the reform efforts. Second, these 
efforts are suffering from the inadequate 
experience and unsystematic approach of 
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both Ukraine’s elite and its administration. 
Third, established interest groups and cor-
rupt networks in the bureaucracy and in 
parts of the political and economic elite 
still play an influential role. Fourth, along-
side the war, Russia is using a great number 
of levers to forestall the process of reforms 
and thus the successful integration of 
Ukraine into western structures. 
Precisely because there are multiple 
forces that impact both positively and nega-
tively on the Ukrainian process of reforms, 
the latter’s outcome remains unclear. It is 
important to explore the favourable factors 
as well as the obstacles standing in the way 
of the reforms, so as to determine how much 
potential there is for more effective external 
support that raises the chances of a positive 
outcome. The alternative is a Ukraine that 
remains unstable in the long run, thwart-
ing the goals of the revised European Neigh-
bourhood Policy and aggravating the cur-
rent refugee crisis in Europe through addi-
tional migrant flows. 
Measuring Rule-of-law Reforms 
The amount of progress that has been 
made so far differs across reform sectors. 
Macro-economic reforms have seen the most 
favourable development. These were not 
only particularly urgent due to the need to 
prevent state default, but were also actively 
supported by external actors. The IMF has 
made its financial assistance explicitly con-
ditional, setting specific benchmarks that 
must be met if Ukraine wishes to continue 
receiving that assistance. Payment of the 
tranche scheduled for late 2015 has been 
delayed because there was no acceptable 
budget for 2016. This shows that the IMF is 
sticking to its terms of reference. The fact 
that the relevant ministries in Kyiv are 
run by people who were socialised outside 
of the Ukrainian system also seems to be 
having a positive impact. Finance Minister 
Natalie Jaresko was raised in the US and has 
worked for the State Department and as an 
investment banker, Minister for Economy 
and Trade Aivaras Abromavicius as a fund 
manager in Lithuania. (The latter submitted 
his resignation in early February 2016, but 
it has not yet been accepted by parliament.) 
Both not only have good contacts among 
relevant external actors, they can also sug-
gest new models of governance and are not 
trapped in existing networks. 
There are no such conditions in place in 
the rule-of-law area. Whilst the economic 
reforms launched by the Ukrainian leader-
ship have generally met with praise and are 
showing the first tender shoots of success, 
there is good reason to criticise the speed 
and application of the rule-of-law reforms. 
These reforms pertain to many spheres, 
since they concern not only the justice sys-
tem but also institutions for combating 
corruption, as well as many measures for 
increasing transparency in politics and 
the economy. It is therefore appropriate to 
judge the progress made so far against a 
broad understanding of the rule of law, 
rather than one limited to specific reform 
sectors. 
The framework of the World Justice 
Project (WJP) lends itself to such an evalu-
ation. This non-governmental organisation 
based in Washington, D.C. uses a Rule of 
Law Index to estimate and compare the 
progress made in establishing the rule of 
law in over 100 countries. For this purpose, 
the WJP conceptualises the essence of the 
rule of law in four principles: 
1) The government, including civil servants 
and plenipotentiaries, as well as individ-
ual persons and private establishments 
are held accountable under the law. 
2) Laws are clear, publicly known, lasting, 
just, and applied without distinction, 
and protect fundamental rights, includ-
ing the right to security of the person 
and safety of property. 
3) The process for passing, applying and 
enforcing laws is transparent, just and 
efficient. 
4) Laws are enforced promptly by compe-
tent, morally irreproachable and inde-
pendent plenipotentiaries or neutral 
persons, who are sufficient in number, 
have the required resources at their dis-
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posal and reflect the characteristics of 
the society they serve. 
By engaging with these principles with 
reference to present-day Ukraine, it is pos-
sible systematically to judge the level of 
rule of law in the country and point out the 
most serious shortcomings. The reasons 
behind these shortcomings can then be 
sought and solutions suggested for rem-
edying them. 
Accountability 
The World Bank’s Public Accountability 
Mechanisms Initiative lists four parameters 
for ensuring sufficient levels of account-
ability of public actors: disclosure of in-
come and asset declarations; a reasonable 
approach to dealing with conflicts of inter-
est; freedom of information; and resolving 
questions of immunity. 
In early 2015, the Law on Preventing 
Corruption came into effect in Ukraine. It 
tightened the reporting requirements on 
income and assets for high-ranking politi-
cians, government officials and their close 
relatives, as well as the conditions for veri-
fication and publication of their declara-
tions. The OECD considers that its recom-
mendations to date for this sector have 
been fully implemented by the new rules. 
However, the success of this reform depends 
on how the National Agency for Corruption 
Prevention (NACP) handles it – this agency 
is responsible for checking income and 
asset declarations. Unlike the Anti-Corrup-
tion Bureau, which began work in October 
2015, the NACP’s activities are to be coordi-
nated by the government. 
Although the Agency was created in 
March 2015, its top posts have still not all 
been filled. Members of the supposedly 
independent selection committee, as well 
as candidates for high office in the agency, 
failed to disclose their connections to Prime 
Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, causing a scan-
dal. In addition, a system that electronically 
registers the assets of high-ranking actors 
for verification by the NACP is scheduled to 
be introduced a year later than originally 
planned. This was mandated by an incon-
spicuous paragraph inserted into the Bud-
get Law of 25 December 2015 at the last 
minute. The system is now to be activated 
on 1 January 2017, at the earliest. 
As the example of allocating the NACP 
posts indicates, conflicts of interest are a 
highly relevant topic for Ukraine. The anti-
corruption law is intended to regulate the 
way such conflicts are dealt with. Here, too, 
the NACP has the final say. However, suc-
cess depends not only on the agency but 
also on the ability and readiness of superi-
ors to recognise and address potential con-
flicts of interest in their colleagues. There 
is a lack of sensitivity for this issue, as the 
example of the Deputy Minister for Energy 
Ihor Didenko demonstrates. In his view, 
co-owning a company with the Ukrainian 
oligarchs Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Hennadiy 
Boholyubov does not constitute a conflict 
of interest – although both of his business 
partners possess substantial interests in the 
energy sector and have received preferen-
tial treatment from Didenko in the past, 
when he held other state posts. Up till now, 
such conflicts of interest have been common 
practice in the country’s political system 
without being penalised or even acknowl-
edged as such. It is therefore necessary to 
raise awareness of the problem, both inside 
Ukraine and with relevant external actors. 
Progress had already been made concern-
ing freedom of information during Viktor 
Yanukovych’s presidency (2010–2014). Fol-
lowing a campaign by local and interna-
tional NGOs, a law came into effect in 2011 
that provides a broad definition of the con-
cept of “public information” and stipulates 
that relevant data should be published even 
without an individual request. The main 
purpose is to inform the public about the 
authorities’ activities and decisions. In 
March 2014, important changes to the law 
were passed. They extend the range of the in-
formation to be published and are intended 
to promote the implementation of said law. 
However, it is precisely this implementation 
that leaves much to be desired. Experts have 
therefore been calling for the creation of 
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a monitoring body with sufficient compe-
tences to enforce implementation. 
Finally, accountability also covers issues 
of immunity. To make good on a campaign 
promise, President Poroshenko presented a 
draft law that would abolish parliamentary 
immunity in general. While the draft was 
declared constitutional by the Constitution-
al Court in June 2015, many experts as well 
as the Council of Europe’s Venice Commis-
sion have spoken out against the planned 
law. It is certainly the case that, for many 
of those wishing to escape prosecution, 
parliamentary immunity is an incentive 
to stand for election. This is especially true 
for corruption cases. However, at the same 
time there is a risk, in a still unconsolidated 
democracy with a poorly functioning divi-
sion of powers, that unwelcome members of 
parliament who are not protected by immu-
nity will become a target for the executive, 
especially where the latter can exert substan-
tial influence on the judiciary. Whether for 
these or other reasons, members of parlia-
ment have yet to pass the law in question. 
In practice, therefore, it continues to be the 
case that members of the Rada (the Ukrain-
ian Parliament) are only stripped of their 
immunity if there seems to be clear evidence 
of criminal offences. This occurred recently 
in the case of Mykola Martynenko: the Prime 
Minister’s political ally stands accused of 
corruption, and the Anti-Corruption Bureau 
is investigating. However, a new general set 
of rules to regulate questions of immunity 
is currently not on the agenda. 
Overall, two trends can be identified in 
the area of accountability. First, the pattern 
that already existed prior to the Euromaidan 
still applies: the legal texts are largely ac-
ceptable, but implementation is flawed. 
Second, a majority of the elite is not pre-
pared to introduce transparent procedures 
or relinquish existing privileges. 
How Legislation is Handled 
The second and third principles set out by 
the World Justice Project concern the way 
that legislation is tackled in the broadest 
sense. They address the content of laws as 
well as their preparation, passage and im-
plementation – the latter being particularly 
problematic in Ukraine. 
Ukrainian laws are published and can be 
publicly accessed on the Parliament’s web-
site. On the whole, the statements contained 
therein are clear and intelligible. However, 
contradictions and vague wordings also 
occur – shortcomings that tend to derive 
from two sources. First, many Rada mem-
bers and staff lack professionalism in harmo-
nising legal texts. Second, individual mem-
bers of parliament, or small groups of them, 
deliberately keep wordings imprecise so as 
to enable different readings of the laws and 
thus secure their own interests or those of 
their respective patrons. 
As a rule, the durability of laws is a given. 
There are, however, at least two exceptions. 
First, certain types of law are regularly re-
written. This primarily concerns electoral 
legislation, which is traditionally altered 
shortly before each election in favour of the 
ruling elite. As a result, there is no con-
tinuity in the electoral or party system, and 
the electoral code that has been repeatedly 
demanded by the OSCE to establish a basic 
foundation for holding elections has not 
materialised. This trend persisted during 
the local elections in October 2015. The 
relevant law had only been passed in July 
of that year, without substantial debate 
either in parliament or in the wider society. 
“Open lists”, which were meant to offer 
citizens more freedom to choose individual 
candidates, were announced but not in fact 
introduced. Access to elections was made 
more difficult for independent candidates. 
The many internally displaced persons, 
meanwhile, were not given an opportunity 
to go to the ballot box. Additionally, for 
security reasons no elections at all were 
held in a number of districts, although 
the criteria behind that decision remained 
opaque. These last two factors presumably 
played into the hands of the ruling coalition 
because they are likely to have reduced the 
voter potential of the successor parties to 
Yanukovych’s former Party of Regions. 
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Second, there are laws that are amended 
frequently to satisfy special interests. An 
example that illustrates the differences 
between the Yanukovych period and today 
is the law on public procurement. Under 
Yanukovych, the law in question was hol-
lowed out by a series of changes, which for 
instance made it legal in certain cases to 
have calls for tenders with only one appli-
cant. After a new law on public procure-
ment was passed in April 2014, a wave of 
modification proposals began. However, 
these have largely been blocked. In addition, 
an electronic system for awarding con-
tracts, called ProZorro, has been gradually 
introduced. After a pilot phase, a law was 
passed in December 2015 to extend the 
system to all areas of public procurement. 
In other words, this sector provides an 
example of a procedural improvement, 
even though it remains vulnerable to cor-
ruption, primarily because of the huge 
sums of money involved. 
The question of whether the contents 
of Ukrainian laws are just is not easy to 
answer. The fact that a large number of 
laws are fast-tracked is, if anything, an 
argument against: this method makes it 
more difficult to check whether draft laws 
have been influenced by special interests. 
Moreover, without any debate in parliament 
or society at large, it is hardly possible to 
broach the issue of different concepts of 
justice or to find a compromise between 
them. Finally, the highly problematic 
Ukrainian justice system (see below) is hard-
ly in a position to deliver objective verdicts, 
even when it is not being used to delay or 
complicate the implementation of laws. 
The latter seems to be the case for the so-
called lustration law, which is intended to 
regulate the dismissal of civil servants on 
political grounds. For an entire year now, 
this law has been in the hands of the Con-
stitutional Court, many of whose judges 
would themselves be affected by the lustra-
tion process. According to international 
evaluations, the law does have questionable 
aspects and should be reworked. The delays 
by the Constitutional Court (and by the 
Rada, which has not yet voted on changes 
that have already been promised) impede 
the necessary confrontation with the coun-
try’s past and the urgent renewal of its elite. 
The justness of certain key laws under-
goes examination by an international 
group of lawyers and other legal experts 
from the Venice Commission. This is an 
important procedure, which often leads 
to meaningful changes in legislation. How-
ever, key Commission recommendations 
are often ignored, or else Ukraine fails to 
wait for the Commission’s final report. In-
stead, the Rada revises and passes the law 
in question after only a preliminary assess-
ment by the Commission, picking up mainly 
on smaller points made by the experts. The 
latter approach enables the ruling elite to 
claim that international opinions have been 
taken into account, without sacrificing its 
own interests to considerations of justice. 
As has already been implied, the speed 
at which many laws are whipped through 
Parliament is a substantial problem. Fre-
quently, pressure from the President or from 
foreign actors is behind such fast-tracking. 
Examples include the budget law, as well as 
laws on decentralisation and tax reforms. 
According to a study by the Open Society 
Foundation, about 60 per cent of all laws 
adopted since the current Rada was elected 
in October 2014 were passed using abbrevi-
ated procedures. This puts an end to any 
possibility of a meaningful debate or the 
necessary fine-tuning of paragraphs. 
The greatest hurdles to applying and 
enforcing laws are still to be found in the 
administrative system. The state apparatus 
operates in hopelessly outmoded ways and 
continues to be largely rooted in Soviet 
patterns. After substantial delays, the Law 
on the Civil Service was adopted in Decem-
ber 2015, and is intended to initiate admin-
istrative reforms. Further delays in its im-
plementation should, however, be expected. 
In addition, secondary documents such as 
regulations, which make it possible to im-
plement laws, often do not materialise at 
all or only inadequately. This is a further 
indication of insufficient professionalism – 
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or of the implementation of undesired laws 
being deliberately sabotaged, depending on 
the circumstances. 
Finally, a chronic problem is the fact 
that legislative acts concerning aspects of 
the rule of law do not stipulate adequate 
sanctions to deter actors from corrupt be-
haviour. Inversely, certain people can – if 
it is politically desirable – be punished with 
disproportionate severity for smaller viola-
tions, because the relevant laws provide too 
much leeway. This is now changing to some 
extent, for instance in anti-monopoly or 
labour legislation. However, the lack of 
positive incentives continues to be problem-
atic. As a rule, civil servants are woefully 
underpaid; the temptation is correspond-
ingly great to engage in bribery or other 
corrupt practices. 
As this overview has shown, the main 
problems with the way legislation is handled 
lie partly with the substance, but mostly 
with the procedures. Procedural problems 
exist starting with the debates on draft laws 
and continuing through all phases including 
the implementation of adopted legal norms. 
There is a striking lack of professionalism, 
and the influence of powerful actors inter-
ested in poorly regulated legal areas ensures 
that important laws intended to promote 
rule-of-law processes are blocked, delayed or 
not effectively implemented. At the same 
time, Parliament lacks a culture of debate 
and compromise, which further encourages 
irregularities. All of this indicates extensive 
continuity among the political and adminis-
trative elite: it has little genuine commit-
ment to reform and only agrees to changes 
when external actors or reform-oriented 
forces inside Ukraine exert correspondingly 
strong pressure. 
Reforming the Justice System 
A major problem with the justice system is 
the persistent lack of independence among 
judges, some of whom are de jure subordi-
nate to the executive, while even more are 
de facto subordinate. However, in Septem-
ber 2015 the Constitutional Commission 
appointed by Poroshenko in March of that 
year approved a draft law that should pro-
tect the independence of the judiciary much 
better than has been the case so far. First, 
it would abolish the trial period for judges 
(currently five years) so that appointed 
judges would no longer be dependent on 
being confirmed by Parliament. Second, the 
role of the President in appointing judges 
would be limited. Third, the Supreme Judi-
cial Council (SJC), which selects judges, 
would be less dependent on the President 
and Parliament than hitherto. The latter 
would each be allowed to nominate two 
members of the Council, with the remain-
ing 17 members being appointed by profes-
sional bodies. Judges would not be com-
pletely unassailable, since they could still 
be transferred by the President or recalled 
even for minor misconduct by the SJC using 
disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, the 
law is potentially a milestone on the road 
to an independent judiciary in Ukraine. 
In December 2015, Parliament voted to 
submit the law to the Constitutional Court, 
which declared it to be constitutional on 
22 January 2016. (Since the law amounts 
to a change to the constitution, the Court 
must approve the draft law before it can be 
adopted with a two-thirds majority by Par-
liament. A simple majority suffices for the 
referral to the Court.) However, there seems 
to be some resistance on Prime Minister 
Yatsenyuk’s part, since he has suggested 
an alternative: dismissing all judges and 
replacing them with new ones. The draft 
law, by contrast, merely provides for a 
review of the existing judges. The Prime 
Minister’s party, People’s Front, currently 
refuses to support the law and may insist 
on a referendum on any possible changes 
to the constitution. This is liable to prevent 
the required two-thirds majority from being 
attained and thus further delay the reform 
of the justice system. 
A second crucial topic is the slow progress 
being made in reforming the Ukrainian 
Prosecutor General’s Office (GPU). In Octo-
ber 2014, a law on this issue was in fact 
adopted, but it only came into effect in 
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April 2015 and is being implemented very 
reluctantly. The powers of the Prosecutor 
General, which had been extensive, were 
limited, and the institution is to be more 
closely embedded in the justice system in 
the future. In addition, new prosecutors 
have been appointed locally. By mid-Decem-
ber 2015, Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin 
had appointed 154 local GPU representa-
tives, albeit using a partly non-transparent 
application procedure which prevented out-
siders from being hired. 
At the national level, reform-oriented in-
dividuals have been appointed as deputies 
of the Prosecutor General. However, the 
Prosecutor General himself is a very con-
troversial figure. This was already true for 
Vitaly Yarema, who held the post from June 
2014 to February 2015, and it continued 
to be the case for his successor Shokin, who 
worked for the GPU since 1981, with the ex-
ception of a few short interruptions. Shokin 
has been explicitly criticised by representa-
tives of Ukraine’s civil society as well as by 
external actors, such as US Vice-President 
Joseph Biden or Jan Tombinski, EU Ambas-
sador to Ukraine and Head of the EU Dele-
gation in Kyiv. Viktor Trepak, who until No-
vember 2015 was First Deputy Director of 
the Ukrainian domestic intelligence service 
(SBU), stated that he had terminated his 
contract because Shokin was blocking the 
fight against corruption. Shokin’s former 
deputy, Vitaly Kasko, claimed that Shokin 
did not approve of lawsuits against former 
high-ranking GPU staff and had therefore 
asked Trepak to give notice. (Kasko himself 
has since resigned in frustration.) The 
reform of the GPU has therefore stagnated, 
putting at risk both financial support from 
abroad and the fulfilment of the Visa Liber-
alisation Action Plan agreed upon with the 
EU. Shokin was finally sacrificed after the 
Rada found the work of the Cabinet of Min-
isters over the past year inadequate, casting 
doubt on both Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko 
(the latter in his capacity as founder of the 
party with the largest parliamentary fac-
tion in the ruling coalition). However, the 
future trajectory of the GPU is still unclear. 
In conclusion, the independence of the 
Ukrainian judiciary is as questionable as 
the informal norms of conduct that guide 
its representatives. While new laws are now 
tackling these problems, there are substan-
tial obstacles to the reforms, as is indicated 
by the delays that have arisen and by the 
dubious personalities who enjoy power and 
influence in this area. Second-tier civil serv-
ants often spend much time and energy on 
achieving a sustainable reform of the sys-
tem, but they are not infrequently thwarted 
at the highest level. 
Overcoming Deficits 
As this evaluation of the measures taken to 
introduce the rule of law has shown, large 
parts of Ukraine’s current elite lack the will 
to bring about substantial change. In addi-
tion, many civil servants are corrupt and 
lack professionalism. Reforms in the rule-
of-law area are therefore proceeding very 
slowly and often remain ineffective. It is 
thus evident that the main driving force for 
such reforms must come from outside of 
the elite – primarily from external actors 
and Ukrainian civil society. 
Since external actors are not in a posi-
tion to replace problematic political fig-
ures, they should place more emphasis on 
raising the level of professionalism. Training 
measures, for instance on tackling conflicts 
of interest, can make a contribution here if 
they are tailored to the Ukrainian context. 
To guarantee this, it would make sense to 
cooperate closely with relevant civil society 
organisations in the country. Experience 
has shown that interactive formats, which 
focus on practical exercises, are more effec-
tive that one-sided consultancy situations. 
It seems advisable to aim for a snowball 
effect, where committed participants iden-
tify other potential interlocutors. This would 
gradually build up a critical mass of indi-
viduals who would be able to assert them-
selves against a majority attempting to 
block the reforms. Such measures should 
not remain limited to the capital city. 
Ukraine has started to decentralise; this 
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offers opportunities for training sessions 
that can increase administrative capacity in 
the regions and simultaneously strengthen 
elements of the rule of law. Should the 
twinning approach be used here – whereby 
civil servants from EU member states are 
brought together with corresponding part-
ners from the Ukrainian state apparatus – 
two things will be important: first, to en-
sure that those involved have adequate lan-
guage skills; second, to select civil servants 
from the EU member states who are familiar 
with the Ukrainian context. 
For elite renewal, performance-based 
transparent recruiting and hiring proce-
dures are imperative (such as have already 
been implemented for the newly estab-
lished police force). It will presumably take 
some time until such procedures become 
the rule, especially for high-ranking posts, 
but the EU and its member states can en-
courage this process through training, 
exchange of views, and monitoring. 
Finally, conditionality can and should be 
used in a more targeted and visible manner. 
Admittedly, this is more difficult with 
regard to the rule of law than in the sphere 
of economic reforms. Suitable benchmarks 
cannot always be clearly defined, and the 
quality of results depends very much on the 
attitude of those involved in their imple-
mentation. However, there is solid evidence 
that external pressure has already led to 
some progress in Ukraine, for instance in 
creating institutions to fight corruption. 
The fact that the EU is currently making 
detailed demands in this area as a precon-
dition for a visa-free regime with Ukraine is 
a good example of concrete conditionality, 
without which real progress is unlikely. The 
goal should be to insist on small but steady 
steps until a point in the adoption of the 
rule of law is reached that renders a return 
to previously entrenched behaviour patterns 
all but impossible. 
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